banned psychoanalysis as a Jewish science and there was no organized psychotherapy in a situation dominated by racial biology. In Psychotherapy in the Third Reich, Cocks recovered the history of the German institute for psychological research and psychotherapy, generally known as the Goering Institute after its chief, the psychotherapist Mathias Goering, a cousin of the infamous Hermann Goering. He dismantled these legends, and indicated how they arose in a postwar era of institutional reconstruction for psychotherapy and psychoanalysis, when practitioners were keen to claim a moral high ground and portray themselves as intrinsically allied to liberal and democratic tendencies and deny any evidence to the contrary. At the same time, he presented what remains the best documented and most judicious account of C G Jung's relations with German psychotherapy at this time. What Cocks accomplished was the relocation of the history of psychoanalysis within the institutional development of psychotherapy as a whole, and of the latter in its connections with medicine and psychology and within the wider social and political context of mid-twentieth-century Germany. Thus the history of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis become critical sites for addressing wider questions concerning how professions develop in relation to varying social and political conditions-critical, in Cocks' view, as by the nature of its subject matter, the psychological enterprise is the most permeable of all disciplines to social and political factors. Thus the cultural and historical study of psychology, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy may ultimately have more generality than the disciplines themselves.
Finally, in a study of the emigre psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut, Cocks demonstrates that in the essay ' At the beginning of the century, Freud and his followers claimed that critics who had not practised psychoanalysis were discounted from passing any comment on it. In a new twist to this, Forrester proposes that before one can criticize psychoanalysis, one has to "lie down on the couch". This recommendation is problematic in many respects, not least because, in psychoanalysis, the patient's testimony is deprived of any epistemological status. If experiencing psychoanalysis is the necessary qualification for commenting on it, should it not equally hold for other mind-affecting practices, such as past-life regression therapy, ECT or Prozac? As the history of psychoanalysis has shown, self-experience and testimony have simply led to a plethora of contradictory accounts, with no criteria to judge their relative validity. Furthermore, if psychoanalysis wishes to transform and colonize other disciplines, should it not also be held accountable in terms of their own criteria of validity?
Dispatches from the Freud wars ends with a fictional interview between Forrester and Freud, in which the latter deals with the posthumous criticisms of his work which have arisen after his death. Readers are likely to find this either amusing or bizarre, according to their tastes.
Truth games commences with an essay of the same name which presents a history of lying, or rather, traces discussions of lying and its significance in philosophy, science, medicine (under the guise of the placebo effect) and the social sciences. The value of this approach is that it opens the way to situating the rise of such disciplines within the history of ethics. This is then used to situate the specificity of psychoanalysis, which according to Forrester is "the only science that does not find the prospect that the 'object' of its inquiry may intentionally deceive the scientific investigator subversive of its pretensions to truth" (p. 69). One would have hoped for more comparative discussion in support of such a statement. This background is utilized to trace the place of truth and lying in the creation of psychoanalysis, and the manner in which Freud conceived of their relation in a way that was distinct both from traditional morality and the epistemology of the natural sciences. Certain questions may be posed here. In his reading of Freud's discussion of transference, Forrester argues that in 1895 Freud had already in some measure arrived at the view that there "are no indications of reality in the unconscious", a formulation which is generally seen to arise in the aftermath of the collapse of the seduction theory in 1897, which is discussed at more length in Freud's women (Forrester and Lisa Appignanesi, London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1992) . If Forrester's argument holds, it raises the question of how the seduction theory of 1896 was even possible.
Truth games closes with an essay on 'Gift, money and debt', which discusses the linkages between money and speech, metaphors of circulation, exchange, indebtedness and trust, through a reading of Freud's case of the Rat Man and Lacan's reading of Freud. Here, Forrester argues that trust "organises any reading of Freud which will do justice to his work ... One must give Freud the benefit of the doubt-and extend this seemingly temporary charitable act indefinitely" (p. 112). One may well ask whether such charity is to be considered the hallmark of any good reading, or, if not, why it is only Freud to whom it is due, as often appears to be the case.
In conclusion, anyone interested in the history of psychoanalysis and the cultural location of psychoanalysis today is likely to find these essays stimulating, engaging and inviting of dialogue. , 1999, pp. xiii, 303, illus., £18.50 (0-674-180224) .
To come right to the point, Howard Kushner has written a masterful history of the disorder known as Tourette syndrome. It is a fine contribution to the history of medicine, a cautionary tale for anyone embarking on the history of a syndrome or a disease, and a very good read. And it is a book about far more than just the history of Tourette syndrome.
At the roots of this study is yet another version of the time-honoured tensions and conflicts between those who favour the somatic explanatory tradition and those who favour the psychological explanatory tradition. As has all too often been the case, each of these explanatory traditions can deteriorate into convictions and dogmatic assertions that either organic etiology or psychological etiology has been proven, without definitive evidence in either case. Both such outcomes are to be found in this one story. "The rise and fall of each successive explanation for and treatment of Tourette syndrome has been as much a study of the power of beliefs of a professional faction as it has been a vindication of either rigorous scientific testing or carefully analyzed clinical results" (p. 219).
The syndrome under discussion first came to public medical attention in Paris in 1825 with the publication by Jean Marc Gaspard Itard of the case of the Marquise de Dampierre who would suddenly erupt in a startling fit of obscene shouts and curses. Then, in 1885, the Parisian neurologist Georges Gilles de la Tourette used this case as his first and prototypical example in describing the illness that he termed "maladie des tics". And today Tourette's syndrome is the common name for a set of behaviours that includes recurrent ticcing and involuntary shouting (sometimes cursing) as well as obsessive-compulsive actions.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, this ailment was claimed by the psychogenic explainers as surely an excellent example of their convictions, with the psychoanalysts taking a central role for several decades after 1920. The somatogenic explainers were never absent from the scene, from early theories that such disorders were postinfection sequelae (strengthened following the 1919 influenza epidemic) to a family of theories derived from modem neuroscience. 
